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When visual input is inconclusive, does previous experience aid the visual system in attaining an accurate perceptual
interpretation? Prolonged viewing of a visually ambiguous stimulus causes perception to alternate between conflicting
interpretations. When viewed intermittently, however, ambiguous stimuli tend to evoke the same percept on many
consecutive presentations. This perceptual stabilization has been suggested to reflect persistence of the most recent percept
throughout the blank that separates two presentations. Here we show that the memory trace that causes stabilization reflects
not just the latest percept, but perception during a much longer period. That is, the choice between competing percepts at
stimulus reappearance is determined by an elaborate history of prior perception. Specifically, we demonstrate a seconds-long
influence of the latest percept, as well as a more persistent influence based on the relative proportion of dominance during a
preceding period of at least one minute. In case short-term perceptual history and long-term perceptual history are opposed
(because perception has recently switched after prolonged stabilization), the long-term influence recovers after the effect of
the latest percept has worn off, indicating independence between time scales. We accommodate these results by adding two
positive adaptation terms, one with a short time constant and one with a long time constant, to a standard model of
perceptual switching.
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INTRODUCTION
The visual system adjusts its processing of current input on the
basis of past experience. Such dynamic adjustment allows, for
instance, faster responses to recurrent stimuli [1] and tuned
weighting of visual cues depending on their previous validity [2]. A
fundamental question for such adaptive systems is how long a
history to incorporate in current processing.
An opportunity to examine the role of history in vision within a
controlled experimental setting is provided by ambiguous stimuli
(Figure 1a). These images convey conflicting information to the eyes,
causing perception to waver randomly between alternative inter-
pretations, or percepts (Figure 1b, top). For instance, if a movie of a
transparent revolving sphere with dots on its surface is stripped of all
depth information, such as perspective and occlusion, it causes
alternating perception of either possible rotation direction (Figure 1a,
left). Alternatively, presenting incongruent images to the two eyes
simultaneously causes alternating perception of either image in
isolation (binocular rivalry; Figure 1a, right). Strikingly, prior
experience can allow the state of perceptual indecision brought
about by ambiguous stimuli to be overcome. That is, when observers
are presented with an ambiguous stimulus they have viewed before,
they often instantly perceive the same interpretation as they did on
the prior encounter, even though the immediate visual input remains
inconclusive. This can lead to prolonged periods of perceptual
stabilization in case an ambiguous stimulus is periodically removed
from view and the same percept keeps reappearing on consecutive
presentations (Figure 1b, bottom) [3–9]. This salient expression of
visual memory provides a convenient measure to study how traces of
past perception interact with current input in shaping what we see.
Perceptual memory for ambiguous stimuli has a persistence of at
least minutes, in the sense that even if an ambiguous stimulus does
not reappear until several minutes after disappearing, the previous
percept often still recurs [3]. Does this imply that a minute-scale
perceptual history is incorporated in processing current visual
stimuli? On the contrary, considering that the percept that is
experienced (or dominant) at reappearance is generally simply the
one that also dominated during the most recent encounter, one is
tempted to conclude that only a single percept is stored, and that
memory is ‘overwritten’ whenever perception changes (switches) to
the alternative interpretation. Memory would then reach back no
further than the moment of the latest switch. This is indeed
implied by the common view that perceptual stabilization of
ambiguous images reflects persistence after stimulus removal of the
present state of perceptual organization [3–5,7,8]. It would appear
that a system centered on persistence of the present dominance
state could store only a single percept at a time.
Within the broader context of history dependence in vision this
view is remarkable. If the goal of a visual memory system is to
optimize processing based on past experience, storage of a single
percept or event is of limited use. Processing would benefit from
incorporating a more elaborate record of past events. Indeed, the
literature does contain indications that persistence of the current
perceptual state may be insufficient to explain history effects in
ambiguous vision. For instance, in case an ambiguous stimulus is
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removed from view only shortly after a perceptual switch occurred
(under about 2 s), the percept that dominated before the switch–not
the most recent percept–often regains dominance at stimulus
reappearance [3]. It is unknown what makes this particular
manipulation exceptional, but the finding seems at odds with the
idea that all memory is erased as soon as perception switches.
Second, when an ambiguous stimulus is preceded by a sequence of
stimuli that are similar but contain unequal evidence for either
interpretation (biased stimuli), influences of several preceding stimuli
on current perception can be measured [9]. Although the use of
biased stimuli complicates the interpretation of the latter findings (see
Discussion), they again suggest that traces of perceptual history may
extend beyond a change in perception, raising the possibility of a
memory system with greater functional merit.
We study how prior perception of an ambiguous stimulus
influences how it is perceived at reappearance, specifically aiming
at distinguishing persistence of the most recent percept from more
intricate influences of past perception. We interleave episodes of
intermittent viewing with episodes of continuous viewing (Figure 2a).
During intermittent viewing perception stabilizes into one interpre-
tation, whereas continuous viewing prompts spontaneous switches
between percepts. The switches are essential, as they permit a
dissociation between the most recent percept (following a switch) and
preceding perception, enabling us to pit the effects of immediate and
more remote perceptual history against each other.
Figure 1. Stimuli and presentation sequences. a, Each of our stimuli has
two distinct perceptual interpretations. Only one percept is experienced
at any given moment. Left: An ambiguous rotating sphere is a two-
dimensional projection of dots covering the surface of a transparent
sphere that rotates around a central axis. Because no cue indicates which
dots are in front, the rotation direction is ambiguous and subjects
perceive either direction in turn, as indicated by the red and green arrows.
Right: In binocular rivalry ambiguity arises because two incompatible
images are projected into the two eyes (designated as ‘L’ and ‘R’). Subjects
perceive the left eye’s image or the right eye’s image in turn. b, Top:
Viewing an ambiguous stimulus continuously, observers experience
random alternations between both percepts every few seconds. Bottom:
Periodically removing the stimulus from view (here: on-time ,0.5 s; off-
time ,1.5 s) causes perception to stabilize in one interpretation for
sometimes minutes, with only incidental switches between alternative
interpretations: Perceptual stabilization.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001497.g001
Figure 2. The effect of spontaneous perceptual switches on
perceptual stabilization. a. Experimental design, Sequences of
intermittent presentation (IP) were interleaved with periods of
continuous presentation (CP). An intermittent presentation sequence
ended when the same percept was reported on eight consecutive
presentations. This percept was termed the sequence winner. In
experiment one a continuous presentation period was terminated after
a randomly varied delay (B) following the first perceptual switch. The
duration (A) between the start of continuous presentation and this
switch varied naturally. b. The probability that the current intermittent
presentation sequence is won by the same percept as the previous
intermittent presentation sequence rises with intervening duration A
but falls with intervening duration B (both p,0.01; Spearman on
individual subjects’ data; n = 6; r=0.68 for A and20.56 for B). It remains
above chance level throughout. Duration A varied continuously; the
three data points were obtained by dividing the durations into three
quantiles (average durations: 1.7, 4.1 and 11.6 s). c. The same
probability plotted separately for cases where percept 1 (red) and
percept 2 (green) won the previous intermittent presentation sequence.
For each subject (x-axis) both bars reach above chance level, so the
high correlation between the current winner and the previous winner
does not reflect a systematic bias toward one percept. d. When
allowing multiple perceptual switches (x-axis) during continuous
viewing, the probability that the current winner equals the previous
winner decreases as the number of intervening switches increases
(p,0.01; Spearman on individual subjects’ data; n = 7, r=20.69). e. For
one representative subject (others shown in Supporting Figure S2) the
probability decreases gradually with increasing duration of the
intervening continuous presentation period (x-axis), reaching chance
after about a minute. This outcome is similar, whether one includes all
data (blue curve and data points), or just cases where percept 1 (red
curve) or percept 2 (green curve) won the previous intermittent
presentation sequence. Error bars indicate standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001497.g002
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RESULTS
The influence of a spontaneous perceptual switch
on stabilization
Two distinct ambiguous stimuli were used in our experiments
(Figure 1). Results presented in the main text are for the ambiguous
rotating sphere stimulus. Data from binocular rivalry are very similar
(Supporting Text S1, Figures S1 and S3). The general layout of the
sessions was the same for all experiments. It is illustrated in Figure 2a
using experiment 1 as an example. Sessions consisted of blocks of
intermittent presentation of an ambiguous stimulus, interleaved with
periods of continuous presentation where perception was allowed to
switch spontaneously. Subjects reported their perceptual state when
a stimulus reappeared and whenever the percept switched.
Transitions between intermittent presentation and continuous
presentation were interactively initiated on the basis of observers’
perceptual reports (Figure 2a, bottom). Intermittent presentation
sequences proceeded until an observer reported the same percept on
eight consecutive presentations, signaling robust stabilization. When
this occurred, the stabilized percept was termed the winner of that
intermittent presentation sequence, and continuous presentation was
started. Continuous presentation periods, in turn, were terminated a
fixed period after an observer reported a perceptual switch, and then
intermittent presentation started again.
In the first experiment we allowed a single switch during
continuous viewing. The delay (‘B’ in Figure 2a) between this
switch and stimulus offset was drawn randomly from the values
0.5, 1.5 and 3 s. This mimicked the aforementioned situation in
[3] where the effect of an incidental switch on stabilization was
shown to depend on this delay. Perceptual switches naturally occur
at random intervals, so the percept preceding the switch (‘A’ in
Figure 2a) also had a variable duration. This allowed us to study
how perception at stimulus reappearance depended on a well-
controlled fraction of perceptual history; that is, on the duration of
both perceptual episodes A and B.
As a main measure we will use the probability that the winner of
a given intermittent presentation sequence equals the winner of
the preceding intermittent presentation sequence. If it does not,
the perceptual switch successfully disrupted perceptual stabiliza-
tion; if it does, perception during this intermittent presentation
sequence reverted to the winner of the previous intermittent
presentation sequence in spite of the intervening switch to the
opposite percept.
Figure 2b plots the subject-averaged probability that the winner of
the current intermittent presentation sequence equals the previous
winner, as a function of the intervening percept durations A and B;
that is, the durations preceding and following the perceptual switch,
respectively. The durations are categorized as ‘brief’, ‘moderate’ and
‘long’, as indicated on the x-axis. In case of percept B these three
categories correspond simply to the three delay durations applied,
whereas for percept A (whose duration varied in a continuous
fashion) we divided the data up into three percentiles to form the
three categories. The light curve shows that the current winner is less
likely to equal the previous winner in case the period following the
switch (percept B) is longer. In other words, the longer the final
percept of the continuous presentation episode dominated before
stimulus offset, the more likely it was to remain stabilized during the
subsequent intermittent presentation sequence, replicating [3]. A
new finding here is that the duration of the percept preceding the
switch (percept A; dark curve) has the opposite effect. That is, the
longer the previous winner remained dominant before the perceptual
switch occurred, the more likely it was to regain dominance during
the subsequent intermittent presentation sequence, in spite of the
intervening switch. Note that the durations A and B were not
correlated in this design, as the delay between the perceptual switch
and stimulus offset was varied independently of the spontaneous
percept duration preceding the switch. Both curves therefore reflect
different, orthogonal, subdivisions of the same data set.
In isolation, the influence of the final percept duration (B) would
be consistent with an explanation that during a blank the visual
system retains its latest perceptual organization, provided this
organization has had sufficient time to establish. The finding of a
comparable influence of the preceding percept duration (A),
however, argues against such an exceptional role for the final
percept. Instead, it suggests that ambiguous figure memory is
determined by a more global perceptual history. Specifically,
Figure 2b leads to the tentative interpretation that the longer a
percept has dominated in the past–be it during the final
dominance period or earlier–the more readily it will regain
dominance when the stimulus reappears.
Apart from the effects of durations A and B, Figure 2b also shows
a general tendency for the winner of the current intermittent
presentation sequence to equal the previous winner; that is, all points
lie above 0.5. Figure 2c addresses whether this could be due to a
systematic tendency for subjects to report one particular percept
during intermittent presentation [10], regardless of history. For
individual subjects this panel shows the probability that the current
winner equals the previous one, both for the cases where percept 1
won the previous intermittent presentation sequence (red) and those
where percept 2 did (green). Both the red and the green bars all reach
beyond 0.5. This demonstrates that the current winner generally
equaled the previous winner regardless of which percept it was,
ruling out systematic bias as an explanation. As an extra measure we
calculated each subject’s individual bias, as the overall fraction of
intermittent presentation sequences won by that subject’s more
predominant percept. This value was 0.57 on average, which is
insufficient to explain the values in Figure 2b. It is striking to note
that even the subject with the strongest systematic bias (0.69) still
showed above-chance recurrence of the previous winner, even in
case this winner was the weaker of the two percepts (observer 4 in
Figure 2c). Further analyses suggest that our comparatively long
sessions (40 min) may have reduced the influence of a systematic bias
in our experiments (Supporting Text S1, Figure S1).
Considering the above findings, one reason why the winner of
the previous intermittent presentation sequence often recurs
during the current intermittent presentation sequence could be
that it has enjoyed much dominance in the past. That is, if it is true
that prior dominance in general increases the probability a percept
will recur after a blank, then the extensive dominance during the
previous intermittent presentation sequence (Figure 2a) could
underlie the previous winner’s elevated probability of regaining
dominance during the current intermittent presentation sequence.
The influence of longer continuous presentation
episodes on stabilization
Would the winner of the previous intermittent presentation sequence
still predominate during the current intermittent presentation
sequence in case a more extensive period of spontaneous switching
intervened, thereby moving the previous intermittent presentation
sequence further into the past? Our second experiment was similar
in design to the first one, but continuous presentation episodes were
allowed to include up to four perceptual switches instead of just one.
The delay between the final switch and the end of continuous
presentation was no longer varied but fixed at the same duration as
one intermittent presentation (,0.5 s).
Figure 2d shows the subject-averaged probability that the
current intermittent presentation sequence was won by the same
History in Visual Ambiguity
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percept as the previous intermittent presentation sequence, as a
function of the number of intervening switches. Indeed, the
probability decreased with an increasing number of switches, with
almost no memory of the previous winner left after four perceptual
switches. Figure 2e (blue curve) quantifies how this memory decay
progressed over time, by depicting the same probability as a
function of the duration of the intervening continuous presentation
episode, for one representative subject. It reveals a gradual
reduction with increasing duration, and the probability reaches
chance level after a minute or so. This indicates that the influence
of the previous winner fades during continuous viewing and is
completely gone after about a minute.
In Figure 2e we again controlled for a potential role of a systematic
preference for one of the two percepts, by reanalyzing the data
separately for occasions where percept 1 won the previous
intermittent presentation sequence (red curve) and those where
percept 2 did (green curve). The red curve runs slightly above the
green curve, indicating an overall tendency for this subject to
perceive percept 1 more than percept 2. Nevertheless, the similarity
between these curves confirms that our results do not depend on a
systematic percept bias. Indeed, the systematic bias in this
experiment was only 0.52 for this subject, and 0.56 on average.
The influence of dominance during continuous
presentation on stabilization
The above findings support the idea that dominance of a given
percept in the recent past facilitates its regained dominance at
stimulus reappearance. Consistent with this idea, the preference
toward the previous winner decreased as a longer period of
alternating dominance separated the moment of stimulus reappear-
ance from the winner’s dominance streak during the previous
intermittent presentation sequence. A more specific prediction from
the hypothesis, however, is that the preference toward the previous
winner should not decay passively during continuous viewing.
Instead, as was also suggested by our first experiment (Figure 2b), the
evolution of the preference during continuous viewing should
depend on what is being perceived. Hence, perception during the
current intermittent presentation sequence should depend on the
previous winner as well as on perception during the intervening
period of continuous presentation.
Figure 3a depicts additional analyses of the second experiment
that confirm this prediction and refine it. Like Figure 2e, Figure 3a
shows the probability that the current intermittent presentation
sequence is won by the winner of the previous intermittent
presentation sequence, as a function of the intervening continuous
presentation duration. To assess how perception during continu-
ous viewing affects this probability, we now separated our data
according to the fraction of the intervening continuous viewing
period that was taken up by dominance of the percept opposite to
the previous winner. This fraction could vary because spontaneous
switches occur at random intervals during continuous viewing, and
also because the number of switches varied. During continuous
presentation periods where the opposite percept dominated a large
fraction of the time (magenta), the bias toward the previous winner
decayed rapidly over time, and eventually even turned into an
opposite bias. If the continuous presentation period contained little
opposite dominance, in contrast (orange), the bias toward the
previous winner remained strong even after prolonged continuous
viewing. The curve for an intermediate fraction of opposite
dominance (blue) falls in between these two extremes. These
results confirm that the preference for the previous winner does
not decay passively during continuous viewing. Instead, it decays
rapidly during dominance of the opposite percept but stays high
Figure 3. The influence of dominance throughout a continuous
presentation episode on stabilization. a, The data of the second
experiment were regrouped according to the fraction of opposite
dominance; that is, the fraction of the time during a continuous viewing
period that subjects experienced the percept opposite to the previous
winner. The relation between the probability for the previous winner to
also win the current intermittent presentation sequence (y-axis) and the
intervening continuous presentation duration (x-axis) is affected by this
fraction. The probability decays faster during continuous viewing
periods containing mainly opposite dominance (magenta) than during
periods containing more dominance of the previous winner itself (blue
and orange). For this panel the durations of continuous presentation
periods were normalized per subject by dividing by their mean
continuous presentation duration (17 s on average), and then pooled
over subjects. Data were split into three quantiles of the fraction of
opposite dominance. Normalized continuous presentation durations for
each of the three groups were then divided into ten quantiles to yield
ten data points. The magenta and blue data points show a negative
trend (p,0.01, Spearman; r=20.98 and –0.68, respectively), but the
orange ones do not (p..25; r=20.07). Note that, overall, the opposite
percept took up more time during continuous viewing than did the
previous winner percept (average fraction of opposite dominance is
0.61). b, The data of the second experiment were reanalyzed to study
perception during the first eight presentations of an intermittent
presentation sequence, as well as during the winning presentation. c,
Probability that the previous winner dominates on individual presen-
tations of the current intermittent presentation sequence, for up to four
intervening perceptual switches (digits and diagrams on the left). In
those conditions where continuous viewing ended in the percept
opposite to the previous winner (after one or three switches), the
probability of perceiving the previous winner is lower during the initial
intermittent presentations following continuous viewing than during
later presentations (trend marked by arrows; Spearman p,0.01; r= 0.88
for both one and three switches). Error bars indicate standard errors
(n = 7).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001497.g003
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during dominance of the previous winner percept itself. This is
consistent with the notion that perception at stimulus reappear-
ance reflects a balance that continuously evolves while viewing an
ambiguous stimulus, ever shifting toward the currently dominant
percept.
The final analysis goes beyond a comparison of the winners of
consecutive intermittent presentation sequences, to include percep-
tion throughout an intermittent presentation sequence (Figure 3b).
We now investigated perception during the first eight presentations
of the current intermittent presentation sequence, as well as during
the winning presentation (which could be either the eighth or a later
one, depending on perception). Figure 3c shows the probability that
the previous winner dominated on these nine presentations, with the
number of intervening perceptual switches during continuous
viewing depicted in diagrams on the left. The plots confirm that
the tendency toward the previous winner decays with an increasing
number of intervening switches. More importantly, however, they
show an influence of the final percept during continuous viewing on
perception during the subsequent intermittent presentation se-
quence. This is visible in the conditions where the intervening
continuous presentation period contained either one or three
perceptual switches (left plots), and therefore ended in the percept
opposite to the previous winner (see diagrams). In those conditions,
subjects reported the previous winner less often during the initial
presentations of an intermittent presentation sequence than during
later presentations. The resulting trend is marked by curved arrows.
In the conditions involving two or four switches, in contrast, where
the last percept during continuous viewing was identical to the
previous winner, no such trend is visible.
An interesting aspect of the influence of the final percept of
continuous viewing (Figure 3c) is its short duration in comparison
to the minute-scale trace left by the winner of the previous
intermittent presentation sequence (Figure 2e). The influence of
the final percept of a continuous presentation period dissipates
within a few intermittent presentations, or about 10 seconds. In
our design, the winning percept dominated on eight consecutive
intermittent presentations, whereas the final percept of a
continuous viewing period dominated only briefly. This suggests
that the longer a percept has dominated, the more persistent a bias
it leaves. Moreover, it appears that a transient bias toward the
most recent percept and a persistent bias toward the previous
winner can exist simultaneously and independently, in the sense
that the bias toward the previous winner is not erased by the
transient bias toward the most recent percept. Instead, as soon as
the transient bias wears off during the course of an intermittent
presentation sequence, the bias toward the previous winner turns
out to be unaffected (Figure 3b). This rebound toward the previous
winner after a temporary tendency toward the opposite percept is
even more pronounced if one externally forces perception to the
opposite interpretation by means of a disambiguated stimulus,
instead of waiting for a spontaneous switch to occur during
continuous presentation (Supporting Text S1, Figure S3). These
data suggest the existence of multiple parallel biases, each
reflecting a different timescale of perceptual history.
A model account based on multi-timescale
adaptation
We interpret our findings as follows. (i) During perceptual
dominance the visual system accumulates a bias toward the
currently dominant percept. (ii) This accumulation takes place on
several timescales, such that prolonged dominance (e.g. during
intermittent presentation) leaves a persistent biasing trace, whereas
brief dominance (e.g. just before the end of a continuous
presentation period) leaves a more transient trace. (iii) Separate
timescales work independently, such that the system can briefly be
biased toward one percept without losing its longer-term bias
toward the other percept. (iv) These biases become evident in
perception when an ambiguous stimulus reappears after an
interruption (rather than during ongoing viewing). Then, the
visual system’s choice between both percepts reflects the balance
between various biasing traces that have so far accumulated. It is
worth emphasizing that this approach treats perceptual stabiliza-
tion as a repeated choice for the same percept on many stimulus
onsets; not as persistence of a single perceptual state (during
stimulus absence the system is in neither perceptual state). What is
to be explained, therefore, is how perceptual history can make the
system choose one percept over the other at stimulus onset.
We have constructed a computational model (Supporting Text
S1, Figure S4) that implements the above four concepts. The
model, an extension of [6], attributes perceptual stabilization to a
history-driven bias in percept choice at stimulus onset. It is a
natural property of the model that this bias takes effect specifically
at stimulus appearance, and not during continuous viewing. An
indication that this is an appropriate property is the experimental
finding that factors that drive dominance at stimulus onset need
not have a similar effect during prolonged viewing [10].
In the model the bias gradually accumulates during perceptual
dominance, due to gradual sensitivity changes, or adaptation [11,12],
of neurons that code the currently dominant percept. The resulting
imbalance in adaptation state persists for some time after the
dominance period itself has ended, and therefore carries information
on past perception–that is, acts as a memory store. At stimulus
reappearance the difference in adaptation state between model
neurons that code a recently dominant percept and those coding the
other percept causes the recently dominant percept to win the
competition. Interestingly, using only a single adaptation term with a
single timescale of persistence, such as used by [6], we were unable to
account for our findings. In contrast, when incorporating two
adaptation terms, one with fast decay and the other more persistent,
our data could be replicated in considerable detail (Figure 4).
DISCUSSION
Our results indicate that when a visual conflict reoccurs, traces of
past perception increase the probability that the visual system will
assume a previous state of interpretation rather than a different
one. Despite its apparently simple nature, such a mechanism could
have great merit for visual function. Visual input quite generally
contains ambiguities, and in normal conditions only one
perceptual interpretation is veridical. Selecting the one correct
interpretation often requires the combination of multiple infor-
mation sources [13] and engages extensive regions of the brain
[14]. The current observations suggest that by biasing the system
toward previous perceptual interpretations-be it the most recent
one or one that consistently dominated longer ago-visual memory
automatically enforces the outcome of previous perceptual
conflicts, and thereby eliminates the need for the same conflicts
to be resolved repeatedly.
Our model work shows that in neural terms this memory could
be carried by the adaptation state of sensory neurons, provided
adaptation occurs on more than one timescale. Indeed, adaptation
in known to occur on a wide range of timescales in sensory cortex
[11,12,15–18], and it has been argued on theoretical grounds that
this holds promise for functional forms of history-dependence in
neural systems [19,20]. The present work thus suggests that the
perceptual memory observed here constitutes one such functional
correlate.
History in Visual Ambiguity
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Our observations seem to conflict with an earlier study [9]
where percept choice at stimulus reappearance was interpreted as
an attempted continuation of the preceding percept sequence. For
instance, a sequence of percepts ABA would cause percept B at
reappearance, forming the regular sequence ABAB. This is
inconsistent with our data mainly because it involves suppressive
effects of past dominance on subsequent percept choice (for
instance when ABA causes B whereas BBA causes A, the initial
percept stimulates opposite perception at the end of the sequence),
whereas we find only facilitation. The discrepancy may be due to
the fact that the stimuli used by [9] were not fully ambiguous but
biased toward one interpretation. The use of ambiguous stimuli
throughout our experiments has allowed us to characterize
memory of the internally constructed interpretation of a stimulus
in isolation. Effects of unbalanced stimuli are probably a
combination of the present effects and differential gain control
at stages prior to where the percept arises [6]. This is known to
cause different effects on subsequent perception [7,21,22].
We modeled our findings by adding a longer adaptation
timescale to an existing model of perceptual stabilization [6]. An
alternative model [23] of stabilization has also been proposed.
Both models are essentially standard oscillator models expanded
with an additional interaction [6] or storage mechanism [23] to
allow a trace of previous perception to bias the next percept choice
at stimulus reappearance. Both models in their original form have
the limitation of lacking multiple timescales of storage. Regardless
of the number of timescales, a drawback of [23] is that is predicts
stabilization of a percept that has dominated briefly before
stimulus offset but no stabilization of a percept that has dominated
longer [Figure 7 in 23]. This is opposite to the experimental
finding that brief dominance will prevent stabilization, and longer
dominance is required for a percept to recur [Figure 2b in the
present work, Figure 3c in 3]. Models of the type of [6] do
reproduce this feature. Arguably a second objection to [23] is that
it entails a binary memory, where the system is in one of two states
of ‘remembering’ either percept. Experiments indicate that,
instead, the system’s bias toward one or the other percept varies
over time in a continuous fashion [Figures 2b, 2e and 3a in the
present work, also 24], consistent with the model we used.
Our view of ambiguous figure memory suggests a relation to
visual memory in other situations. Previous notions that attributed
perceptual stabilization to prolongation of a perceptual state
during stimulus absence seemed to imply that it is a specifically
ambiguity-related phenomenon. The present view of perceptual
stabilization as a bias in a decision network–in this case regarding
a perceptual decision at stimulus onset–allows more room for
extensions beyond ambiguous perception. Specifically, the accu-
mulation of a bias during perceptual dominance that we observe
here is reminiscent of the progressive decrease in response time
that is observed when subjects direct their attention [1,25] or eye
fixation [26,27] to a similar search target appearing on several
consecutive trials. This type of attention priming occurs automat-
ically, independent of conscious recollection. It has been attributed
to progressive use-related changes that build up in the neural
structures activated when the target is attended [25,27], so that
every allocation of attention or gaze to an item simultaneously acts
to stimulate reorientation to that item in the future. This is
analogous to the accumulating bias that facilitates repeated
perceptual dominance in our paradigm, a similarity that is
particularly remarkable considering the numerous other parallels
between attentional selection and perceptual dominance [14,28].
Our findings bear directly on the question asked at the outset, how
long a history to incorporate into current processing. Functionally,
the answer depends on the liability for the conditions to change. If
they change every few seconds it is useless to incorporate a minute-
scale history because what happened a minute ago bears little
relation to the present situation. If, in contrast, the conditions remain
relatively stable for minutes, incorporating a longer-term history
prevents unfavorable sensitivity to seconds-long (noisy) excursions.
Our findings suggest how just such a strategy is implemented in
vision, by use of parallel biasing traces on several timescales. In case
of ambiguity resolution, if recent perception was highly stable, slow
biases have built up sufficiently to outweigh the fast bias due to the
most recent percept. If perception was variable, however, no slow
biases have accumulated and the most recent percept becomes the
main driving factor. This organization therefore ensures automatic
adjustment of the effective memory timescale, dependent on the
changeability of the situation at hand.
Figure 4. Model simulations. Our key findings are replicated by a model in which information on past perception is contained in the adaptation
states of sensory neurons. a, Influence of one intervening perceptual switch on perceptual stabilization (cf. Figure 2b). The relation between percept
durations A and B (see Figure 2a) and perceptual stabilization is replicated by the model. b, Influence of multiple intervening perceptual switches on
perceptual stabilization (cf. Figure 3c). The probability that the previous winner is perceived during the current intermittent presentation sequence
decreases with an increasing number of intervening switches, in line with the experimental data. In case the final percept during continuous viewing
was opposite to the previous winner (one or three switches) the probability rises during the current intermittent presentation sequence (Spearman
p,0.01; r= 0.95 and 0.92 for one and three switches, respectively), consistent with our experimental findings.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001497.g004
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects and task
Subjects were two authors and sixteen naive observers. All had
normal or corrected-to-normal acuity. After showing subjects the
stimuli and explaining their task, we orally obtained an informed
consent statement before proceeding with the experiment. All
experiments were conducted in agreement with Utrecht University
ethics and safety guidelines. Three subjects showed a strong
preference for one of the percepts during pilot experiments, and
were not included in further testing. The remaining subjects had an
average preference, as measured by the fraction of all intermittent
presentation sequences won by their preferred percept, of 0.57
(s=0.05) and 0.61 (s=0.06) for the sphere and rivalry, respectively.
Subjects were instructed to fixate the center of the display passively,
and report their percepts via key presses. Experimental sessions took
40 minutes.
Apparatus and stimuli
Ambiguous stimuli were an ambiguous rotating sphere (r= 0.65 deg;
v=2.23 rad/s; 90 black dots of r = 0.02 deg; dot lifetime=1 s) and
dichoptic +/245 deg grayscale Gabor patches (s=0.37 deg; 100%
contrast; spf = 2.7 c/deg). Stimuli were presented on a gray
background (35 cd/m2) within a white alignment ring (r= 1.7 deg)
and with a red plus sign (side=0.2 deg) marking fixation for the
sphere. They were presented via a mirror stereoscope, on a CRT
monitor (160061200 dpi) at a visual distance of 47 cm.
Intermittent presentation sequences
The timing of intermittent presentation was optimized for each
subject beforehand, to find a regime with robust perceptual
stabilization. We therefore designed an adaptive procedure that
dynamically adjusted stimulus timing according to a subject’s
perceptual reports, until no alternation was reported during 60 s of
intermittent presentation. The average presentation duration was
0.5 s for both stimuli; the average blank duration was 1.4 s for
binocular rivalry and 1.2 s for the ambiguous sphere. In all
experiments we terminated and discarded an IP sequence if a
subject did not reach a stable percept within 24 intermittent
presentations. This happened on 1.3% of the occasions.
Continuous viewing periods
The blank interval between the end of continuous viewing and the
initial intermittent presentation was equal to the interval between
consecutive presentations during intermittent viewing. In the first
experiment the delay between the single perceptual switch and the
end of continuous viewing was either 0.5, 1.5 or 3 s. A continuous
viewing period was discarded if a second switch occurred during
the delay, which for the three delay durations happened on 1, 13
and 29% of the occasions, respectively. In the second experiment
the number of spontaneous switches varied randomly from 1 to 4
within sessions. The delay between the final switch and the end of
continuous viewing was chosen equal to the duration of one
presentation during intermittent viewing. This delay was chosen
for experimental efficiency, because by design a presentation
duration during intermittent viewing was short enough to
minimize the occurrence of additional switches before stimulus
offset. The analysis of memory decay during continuous
presentation (Figures 2e, 3a and S2) required more data than
the other analyses, and was based on additional sessions with three
naive observers of the sphere.
Forced perceptual switches
In the experiments where perception was exogenously forced away
from the previous winner (Figure S3), unambiguous stimuli were
constructed as follows. For the ambiguous sphere we added
binocular disparity to the dots, defining a unique rotation
direction. Brief exposure to such an unambiguous rotation
direction tends to cause perception of that same rotation direction
during subsequent ambiguous viewing [29]. For binocular rivalry
the unambiguous stimulus consisted of one of the eyes’ images in
isolation, which caused dominance of the opposite eye’s image
during subsequent ambiguous viewing (flash suppression [30]). An
effective duration of unambiguous presentation was determined
per subject in pilot sessions beforehand, and amounted to 0.9 s on
average for the sphere, and 0.8 s on average for binocular rivalry.
SUPPORTING INFORMATION
Supporting Figure S1
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001497.s001 (1.11 MB EPS)
Supporting Figure S2
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001497.s002 (0.82 MB EPS)
Supporting Figure S3
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001497.s003 (0.75 MB EPS)
Supporting Figure S4
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001497.s004 (1.00 MB EPS)
Text S1 Supporting text
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001497.s005 (0.05 MB
DOC)
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors thank Jeroen van Boxtel, Wim van de Grind, Bart Krekelberg,
Erik Slootweg, Nao Tsuchiya and Tutis Vilis for valuable comments on
previous versions of the manuscript.
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: RK TK JB. Performed the
experiments: TK JB. Analyzed the data: JB. Contributed reagents/
materials/analysis tools: Bv RK Rv. Wrote the paper: TK JB. Other:
Contributed to model analysis: AN. Contributed to the paper: AN Bv Rv
RK.
REFERENCES
1. Maljkovic V, Nakayama K (2000) Priming of popout III: A short-term implicit
memory system beneficial for rapid target selection. Visual Cognition 7: 571–595.
2. Ernst MO, Banks MS, Bulthoff HH (2000) Touch can change visual slant
perception. Nat Neurosci 3: 69–73.
3. Leopold DA, Wilke M, Maier A, Logothetis NK (2002) Stable perception of
visually ambiguous patterns. Nat Neurosci 5: 605–609.
4. Maier A, Wilke M, Logothetis NK, Leopold DA (2003) Perception of temporally
interleaved ambiguous patterns. Curr Biol 13: 1076–1085.
5. Orbach J, Ehrlich D, Heath HA (1963) Reversibility of the Necker Cube. I. An
Examination of the Concept of ‘‘Satiation of Orientation’’. Percept Mot Skills
17: 439–458.
6. Noest AJ, Van Ee R, Nijs MM, Van Wezel RJA (2007) Percept choice sequences
driven by interrupted ambiguous stimuli: a low-level neural model. J Vis 7: 1–14,
http://journalofvision.org/7/8/10/, doi:10.1167/7.8.10.
7. Pearson J, Clifford CW (2005) Mechanisms selectively engaged in
rivalry: normal vision habituates, rivalrous vision primes. Vision Res 45:
707–714.
8. Chen X, He S (2004) Local factors determine the stabilization of monocular
ambiguous and binocular rivalry stimuli. Curr Biol 14: 1013–1017.
9. Maloney LT, Dal Martello MF, Sahm C, Spillmann L (2005) Past trials
influence perception of ambiguous motion quartets through pattern completion.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 102: 3164–3169.
History in Visual Ambiguity
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 January 2008 | Issue 1 | e1497
10. Carter O, Cavanagh P (2007) Onset rivalry: brief presentation isolates an early
independent phase of perceptual competition. PLoS ONE 2: e343.
11. Ohzawa I, Sclar G, Freeman RD (1985) Contrast gain control in the cat’s visual
system. J Neurophysiol 54: 651–667.
12. Bonds AB (1991) Temporal dynamics of contrast gain in single cells of the cat
striate cortex. Vis Neurosci 6: 239–255.
13. Ernst MO, Bulthoff HH (2004) Merging the senses into a robust percept. Trends
Cogn Sci 8: 162–169.
14. Leopold DA, Logothetis NK (1999) Multistable phenomena: changing views in
perception. Trends Cogn Sci 3: 254–264.
15. Muller JR, Metha AB, Krauskopf J, Lennie P (1999) Rapid adaptation in visual
cortex to the structure of images. Science 285: 1405–1408.
16. Ulanovsky N, Las L, Farkas D, Nelken I (2004) Multiple time scales of
adaptation in auditory cortex neurons. J Neurosci 24: 10440–10453.
17. Albrecht DG, Farrar SB, Hamilton DB (1984) Spatial contrast adaptation
characteristics of neurones recorded in the cat’s visual cortex. J Physiol 347:
713–739.
18. Rose D, Lowe I (1982) Dynamics of adaptation to contrast. Perception 11:
505–528.
19. Drew PJ, Abbott LF (2006) Models and properties of power-law adaptation in
neural systems. J Neurophysiol 96: 826–833.
20. Gilboa G, Chen R, Brenner N (2005) History-dependent multiple-time-scale
dynamics in a single-neuron model. J Neurosci 25: 6479–6489.
21. Brascamp JW, Knapen THJ, Kanai R, Van Ee R, Van den Berg AV (2007)
Flash suppression and flash facilitation in binocular rivalry. J Vis 7: 1–12, http://
journalofvision.org/7/12/12/, doi:10.1167/7.12.12.
22. Kanai R, Verstraten FA (2005) Perceptual manifestations of fast neural
plasticity: motion priming, rapid motion aftereffect and perceptual sensitization.
Vision Res 45: 3109–3116.
23. Wilson HR (2007) Minimal physiological conditions for binocular rivalry and
rivalry memory. Vision Res 47: 2741–2750.
24. Pastukhov A, Braun J (2007) Temporal characteristics of priming effects on
the perception of ambiguous patterns [Abstract]. J Vis 7: 367, http://
journalofvision.org/7/9/367/, doi:10.1167/7.9.367.
25. Kristjansson A (2006) Rapid learning in attention shifts: A review. Visual
Cognition 13: 324–362.
26. McPeek RM, Maljkovic V, Nakayama K (1999) Saccades require focal attention
and are facilitated by a short-term memory system. Vision Res 39: 1555–1566.
27. Dorris MC, Pare M, Munoz DP (2000) Immediate neural plasticity shapes
motor performance. J Neurosci 20: RC52.
28. Mitchell JF, Stoner GR, Reynolds JH (2004) Object-based attention determines
dominance in binocular rivalry. Nature 429: 410–413.
29. Jiang Y, Pantle AJ, Mark LS (1998) Visual inertia of rotating 3-D objects.
Percept Psychophys 60: 275–286.
30. Wolfe JM (1984) Reversing ocular dominance and suppression in a single flash.
Vision Res 24: 471–478.
History in Visual Ambiguity
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 January 2008 | Issue 1 | e1497
